SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIVIL DIVISION
FREDERICK SHADDOCK,
Plaintiffs, 2025-CAB-004804
Judge Carl E. Ross
V. CASE CLOSED
OKSANA SHEMET SHADDOCK,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Pending before the Court is Defendant Oksana Shemet Shaddock’s Motion to Dismiss
(hereinafter "Motion"), filed November 19, 2025. Plaintiff failed to file an Opposition and the time
to do so has since passed. The Court considered the motion, the relevant law, and the entire record
therein. For the following reasons, the Motion to Dismiss is granted.
F ACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff initiated an action against Defendant for Declaratory Judgement
to Void a Quitclaim Deed for Defects. The Court’s October 29, 2025, Order permitted Plaintiff to
file an Amended Complaint to include claims for Equitable Reformation of Title. On November
12, 2025, Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint, which includes counts for Declaration of
Marital Property, Void Fraudulent Quitclaim Deed, lnjunction Against Obstruction, and Equitable
Reformation of Title. Am. Compl. at 2. Namely, Plaintiff seeks for a Court order deeming the
property located on 520 N Street SW, S-316, Washington D.C., 20024 (hereinafter "the Property")
as marital property, to void the deed, and add his name to the title. Further, Plaintiff seeks an
"injunction against obstructions" for the shared marital property located in Iowa (hereinafter "lowa
Property") See Am. Compl. Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss, arguing lack of subject
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matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficient process, and failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. Primarily, Defendant argues that the Parties’ ongoing divorce
proceeding in Iowa court divests this Court of jurisdiction over the matter.
LEGAL STANDARD
I. Subject Matter Jurisdiction - Rule 12(b)(1)
Under D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure l2(b)(l), a court should dismiss an
action when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. l2(b)(l). Subject matter
jurisdiction "concerns the court’s authority to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the
case under consideration." In re JW., 837 A.2d 40, 44 (D.C. 2003). When considering a Rule
l2(b)(l), courts may "conduct an independent review of the evidence submitted by the parties . . .
to resolve factual disputes concerning whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists." Matthews v.
Automated Bus. Sys. & Servs., Inc., 558 A.2d ll75, ll79 (D.C. l989). The Superior Court "has
jurisdiction of any civil action or other matter (at law or in equity) brought in the District of
Columbia." DeGroot v. DeGroot, 939 A.2d 664, 668 (D.C. 2008). Particularly, the Family Court
has "jurisdiction over...actions for divorce...including proceedings...for support and custody of
minor children." Id. When a court enters the original divorce decree, that trial court has continuing
jurisdiction to modify the original determination, including determinations of child custody and
support. Id.
II. Personal Jurisdiction - Rule l2(b)(2)
"A motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction tests not whether the plaintiff will
prevail on the merits, but instead whether or not the court may properly exercise jurisdiction over
the movants." See Kundrat v. District of Columbia, l06 F. Supp. 2d l, 4 (D.D.C. 2000). At the
complaint stage, the plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing that a court has
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personal jurisdiction over a particular defendant. See Companhia Brasileira Carbureto De Calcio
v. Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 35 A.3d 1127, 1135 n.9 (D.C. 2012) ("When ruling upon
personal jurisdiction without an evidentiary hearing, a court ordinarily demands only a prima facie
showing of jurisdiction by the plaintiffs.") (internal citations omitted). ln order for a court in the
District of Columbia to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff
must satisfy a two-part test: (1) personal jurisdiction must be authorized by the District of
Columbia’s long-arm statute; and (2) "the exercise of personal jurisdiction must comport with the
requirements of due process." See, e. g., Companhia, 35 A.3d at 1130; Jackson v. Loews Wash.
Cinemas, Inc., 944 A.2d 1088, 1092 (D.C. 2008). The District of Columbia long-arm statute
provides, in relevant part, that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a party as to a claim
for relief arising from that party’s "(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; (2)
contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia." See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)-(2).A court may exercise specific jurisdiction "whenever the defendant has purposefully
directed its activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation has resulted from alleged injuries
that arise out of or relate to those activities." See Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d
320, 331 (D.C. 2000); see also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984);
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). Due process is
satisfied when the nonresident defendant has "had sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with the forum
state to justify subjecting [the company] to the exercise of personal jurisdiction by its courts." See
Environmental Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng ’rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 811 (D.C.
1976). ln determining whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court may consider materials outside
the pleadings. Frost v. Catholic Univ. ofAm., 960 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting
Jerome Stevens Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
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III. Failure t0 State a Claim - Rule 12(b)(6)
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted under 12(b)(6) if the
pleadings do not satisfy the standard set forth in Rule 8(a). See generally Potomac Dev. Corp. v.
D. C., 28 A.3d 531 (D.C. 2011); D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a), 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a), a pleading
must contain a "short and plain statement ofthe claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
See id. at 8(a); Ashcroh v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (explaining Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which closely mirrors D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 8).
The Complaint must be "specific enough to give the defendant fair notice of what the. .. claim is
and the grounds upon which it rests." Tingling—Clemmons v. District ofColumbia, 113 A.3d 241,
245 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)) (internal
quotations omitted); Galloway v. Chugach Gov ’t Servs., 199 F. Supp. 3d 145, 250 (D.D.C
2016). Courts must accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint. Grayson v. AT &T Corp.,
15 A.3d 219, 229 (D.C. 2011).
A plaintiff who wishes to survive a motion to dismiss under D.C. Superior Court Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must provide "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face." See T vvombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (plaintiffs must "[nudge] their claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible"); Mazza v. Hoasecra)9 LLC, 18 A.3d 786, 791 (D.C. 2011) (holding that
T wombly and Iqbal apply in this jurisdiction because D.C. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 8(a) is identical to
its federal counterpart). Whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific
task that obliges the court to draw on its "judicial experience and common sense." Potomac Dev.
Corp., 28 A.3d at 545 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The "plausibility" pleading standard does
not require "detailed factual allegations" at the initial litigation stage of filing the complaint, but
"it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." See
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Pleadings that offer "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action" are not sufficient. Id. A claim is plausible on its face "when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id.
IV. Conceded Motion
Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure l2-l(e) allows the Court to treat unopposed motions
as conceded. "The conceded motion provision is a judicial housekeeping device intended to serve
the cause of judicial efficiency and case management and to benefit the administration of justice."
District of Columbia v. Davis, 8ll A.2d 800, 803 (D.C. 2002) (quotation marks and citation
omitted); National Voter Contact, Inc. v. Versace, 5ll A.2d 393, 397 (D.C. l986) ("Rule l2-l(e)
is a superior judicial housekeeping device"). This provision also furthers the judge’s obligation to
"remain a disinterested and objective participant in the proceeding" and not "align himself with
any ofthe parties at trial." See Kalika v. United States, 994 A.2d 765, 783 (D.C. 2010) (quotation
and citation omitted); Haaghton v. Byers, 398 A.2d l8, 2l (D.C. l979) (the judge may not "tak[e]
on the role of the advocate") (quotation and citation omitted); see also Code of Judicial Conduct
Rule 2.2 ("A judge shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially."). Courts
treat as waived any argument made only perfunctorily because "[i]t is not enough merely to
mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work,
create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones." See Wagner v. Georgetown
University Medical Center, 768 A.2d 546, 554 n.9 (D.C. 200l) (quotation and citation omitted). A
fortiori, the court need not do a party’s work when a party does not mention a possible argument
at all. See Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d ll9, l22 (D.D.C. 2002) ("The court’s role is not to
act as an advocate for [one party] and construct legal arguments on his behalf in order to counter
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those in the motion" to which he did not file a timely response). Indeed, even a self-represented
litigant "cannot generally be permitted to shw the burden of litigating his case to the courts."
Berkley v. D. C. Transit, Inc., 950 A.2d 749, 756 n. 11 (D.C. 2008) (emphasis in original, quotations
and citations omitted).
For a dispositive motion like this one, "[t]he general principle is that [a conceded motion
provision] may properly be utilized only where the movant has established a prima facie
entitlement to relief." Davis, 811 A.2d at 804. Compare Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 105 &
n.2 (D.C. 1993) (reversing trial court’s dismissal of complaint on grounds that the trial court raised
sua sponte because the grounds were not clear from the face of the complaint) (emphasis added),
with In re TC., 999 A.2d 72, 83 (D.C. 2010) (upholding judicial intervention in the absence of
objection "when the judge detects a patent omission which might vitiate" a just determination of
the case) (emphasis added, quotation and citation omitted). This general principle "balance[s] the
benefits to the administration of justice by an interpretation of Rule 12-l(e) that would allow the
trial courts to grant [dispositive motions] on the sole ground that no timely opposition has been
filed, against the costs to litigants of foreclosure of their cause of action." National Voter Contact,
Inc., 511 A.2d at 397; see Cohen v. Board ofTrustees ofthe University ofthe District ofColumbia,
819 F.3d 476, 480-482 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (discussing the tension between (a) conceded-motion
rules and (b) rules placing the burden on the moving party to establish grounds for dismissal and
summary judgment and the preference for resolving disputes on their merits). See also Murray v.
District ofColumbia, 870 A.2d 25, 27 (D.C. 2005) (Rule 12-1(e) permits but does not require the
court to treat a motion as conceded); Town Center Management Corp. v. Chavez, 373 A.2d 238,
242 n.5 (D.C. 1977) (no error in refusing to grant relief requested in unopposed motion). Thus,
even if a dispositive motion is not opposed in whole or in part, the Court has a duty to consider its
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merits — but not with the degree of scrutiny that the Court would apply if the non-moving party
had actually objected.
ANALYSIS
I. The Court Dismisses Count I, Declaration of Marital Property, for Lack of
Subj ect Matter Jurisdiction.
The Court dismisses Count 1 of Plaintiff’ s Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Pursuant to D.C. Code § 11-1101(a)(8), "[t]he Family Court of the District of
Columbia shall be assigned and have original jurisdiction over determinations and adjudications
of property rights, both real and personal, in any action referred to in this section, irrespective of
any jurisdictional limitation imposed on the Superior Court[.]" Under D.C. Code § 16-910,
(a) Upon entry of a final decree of legal separation, annulment, or divorce,
or upon the termination of a domestic partnership pursuant to § 32-702(d) or § 16-
904(e) and the filing of a petition for relief available under this section, in the
absence of a valid antenuptial or postnuptial agreement resolving all issues related
to the property of the parties, the court shall:
(1) Assign to each party the party's sole and separate property acquired prior
to the marriage or domestic partnership, and the party's sole and separate property
acquired during the marriage or domestic partnership by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent, and any increase thereof, or property acquired in exchange therefore;
(2) Value and distribute all other property and debt accumulated during the
marriage or domestic partnership that has not been addressed in a valid antenuptial
or postnuptial agreement or a decree of legal separation, regardless of whether title
is held individually or by the parties in a form of joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entireties, in a manner that is equitable, just, and reasonable. ..
Accordingly, the Family Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the Parties’ property rights
only after an entry of a final decree of legal separation, annulment, or divorce. See id. lt is well
established that a court must have subj ect matter jurisdiction to enter a divorce decree and personal
jurisdiction over the Parties to make subsequent determinations on property. See e. g., DeGr00t v.
DeGr00t, 939 A.2d 664 (D.C. 2008). From the Amended Complaint, it appears that Plaintiff seeks
(1) a Court order designating the Property as marital property under D.C. Code § 16-910, (2) to
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void the allegedly forged quitclaim deed, and (3) to amend the Property’s title to include Plaintiff’ s
name. See Am. Compl. However, as corroborated by Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff filed for
dissolution of marriage in Jefferson County, Iowa, on May 26, 2024. It appears that the case is
currently pending, and the Iowa courts have yet to enter a final divorce decree. As such, this Court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over the Parties because the
Parties previously filed for divorce in another state. This Court therefore cannot make
determinations as to the Property because the Property is the subject of another action. Plaintiff
Shaddock may file for divorce, should he please, in the District of Columbia’s Family Court,
provided that he meets the requirements set forth in Chapter 9 of the D.C. Code. Accordingly,
Count I, Declaration of Martial Property, is dismissed.
II. The Court Dismisses Count II for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction and
Claim Preclusion
The Court dismisses Count II, Void Fraudulent Quitclaim Deed under the doctrine of claim
preclusion and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff contends
that on "October l0, 20l2, Defendant purchased the DC Condo yet omitted Plaintiff from the title
and denied her husband Authorized Occupant status, cooperative voting rights, elevator fob, and
200l Mercedez C230 key..." Am. Compl. at l. Plaintiff therefore seeks to void the allegedly
fraudulent quit claim deed for fraud. Id. "Under the doctrine of claim preclusion (res jaaiieata), a
valid final judgment on the merits absolutely bars the same parties from relitigating the same claim
in a subsequent proceeding." Parker v. Martin, 905 A.2d 756, 762 (D.C. 2006). In determining the
applicability of claim preclusion, the Court must consider; (l) whether the claim was adjudicated
finally in the first action, (2) whether the present claim is the same as the claim which was raised
or which might have been raised in the prior proceeding, and (3) whether the party against whom
the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior case. Patton v. Klein, 746
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A.2d 866, 870 (D.C. 1999). A dismissal with prejudice is not treated any differently than a
judgement. See Molovinsky, v. Monterey Co—op., Inc., 689 A.2d 531, n.l (citing Super. Ct. R. Civ.
Pro. 4l(a)(l)(ii) ("filing of a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice operated as an adjudication on
the merits."))
In Shaddock v. Shaddoek, 2025-CAB-000953, Plaintiff Shaddock filed a petition to add his
name to the title for the same property in question. See Order, March 20, 2025. The Court granted
Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that the District is not the appropriate forum to adjudicate
the matter considering the existence of the Iowa divorce proceeding. The Court also noted that the
District of Columbia is not a community property state, and it is not within the Court’s jurisdiction
to provide the relief requested. Claim preclusion applies here because the first action was dismissed
with prejudice, the previous matters involved the same property and the same requested relief, and
the named Defendant in the previous matter is the same Defendant as the instant matter. Therefore,
the Court dismisses Count II under the doctrine of claim preclusion.
Altematively, the Court also dismisses the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as
previously held by the Court in the previous matter. The District of Columbia is not the appropriate
forum to adjudicate property ownership considering the existence of the Iowa divorce proceeding.
III. Count III, Injunction Against Obstruction, is Dismissed for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction and Failure to State a Claim.
The Court dismisses Count III, Injunction Against Obstruction, for failure to state a claim
under Rules l2(b)(2) and l2(b)(6). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant denied her tenant, Ms. J onitka
Scott, access to the Iowa Property. Am. Compl. 1] ll. Further, Defendant allegedly instructed third
parties, Mary Jones and Chris Haggard, to enter the Iowa Property and remove items without the
Petitioner’s consent. From these claims, it appears that Plaintiff seeks a Court order enjoining
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further evictions and disturbance to the Iowa Property. Am. Compl. at 2. The Court dismisses these
claims for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.
First, the Court does not have personal jurisdiction over Defendant. A court may exercise
personal jurisdiction so long as it is authorized by D.C. long arm statute and comports with the
requirements of due process. See, eg., Companhia, 35 A.3d at 1130; Jackson v. Loews Wash.
Cinemas, Inc., 944 A.2d 1088, 1092 (D.C. 2008). The District of Columbia long-arm statute
provides, in relevant part, that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a party as to a claim
for relief arising from that party’s "(1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia; (2)
contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia." See D.C. Code § 13-423(a)(1)-(2).
Here, Plaintiff’ s claims rest on Defendant’s conduct in their shared marital property located in
Iowa. Plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over Defendant. Specifically, Defendant resides in Iowa, Plaintiff stated that he is a resident of
Iowa for the purposes of initiating a divorce proceeding in the state, and the property in question
is in Iowa. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to include any information demonstrating how D.C. Courts
can exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate matters wholly based in Iowa. The District’s long-arm
statute does not apply here because the Complaint does not state that the Parties engage in business
or services such that they reasonably foresee litigation in D.C. Courts.
Generally, the power to affect title and land resides in the court of the state of the sitas of
the land. See Davis v. Davis, 957 A.2d 576, 580 (D.C 2008). The home is located in Iowa, and an
injunction should be sought only in Iowa court. Plaintiff also claims that the Iowa Property is
marital property, which would therefore make it the subject of the divorce proceedings in Iowa.
For the reasons stated, it would be improper for D.C. courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the Defendant.
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Further, the Court dismisses the action for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). A
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted if the pleadings do not satisfy the
standard set forth in Rule 8(a) See generally Potomac Dev. Corp. v. D. C., 28 A.3d 531 (D.C. 2011);
D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a), 12(b)(6). Under Rule 8(a), a pleading must contain a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." D.C. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a),
12(b)(6). Plaintiff’ s Amended Complaint plainly states that the Court shall "enjoin obstruction,
including lockouts, on either property, for Plaintiff, or tenants, regardless of race[.]" Am. Compl.
at 2. To plausibly support this claim, Plaintiff must provide sufficient factual details demonstrating
how Defendant’s conduct violated the law, which entitles Plaintiff to relief. Instead, Plaintiff fails
to articulate how Defendant’s conduct violated the law, especially when the facts indicate that
Defendant’s actions were not directed towards Plaintiff, but rather towards other third parties. The
Court even permitted Plaintiff to file an Amended Complaint, which provided Plaintiff with an
opportunity to file a Complaint in accordance with the Rules. Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’ s
claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
IV. The Court Dismisses Count IV, Equitable Reformation of Title, For Failure to
State a Claim.
The Court dismisses Count IV, Reformation of Title, for failure to state claim under Rule
12(b)(6). Plaintiff requests that the Court "[r]eform title [of The Property], with approximately
$1000 cost paid by Plaintiff to the title company." Am. Compl. at 2. The doctrine of equitable
reformation is an equitable remedy which allows the court to alter a contract when the parties
show, through clear and convincing evidence, that there was a mutual mistake in drafting the
contract. See 230] MSt. Coop. Ass ’n v. Chromium LLC, 209 A.3d 82, n.9 (D.C. 2019). D.C. Courts
hold that reformation is appropriate when an agreement has been reached by the parties and the
writing does not accurately express their mutual agreement. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. District of
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Columbia, 948 A.2d 1181, 1191 (D.C. 2008). The purpose of reformation is "driven by a respect
for the parties’ intent and gives effect to the terms mutually agreed upon by the parties." Id.
Attached to the original Complaint is the alleged quit claim deed, which Plaintiff claims is
fraudulent. The exhibit includes a photocopy of the deed, with Plaintiff’ s edits in red ink. The
exhibit alone, which is not attached to the Amended Complaint, is insufficient to meet the standard
set forth in Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, the Amended Complaint does not state the circumstances
behind the formulation of the deed, how the deed is fraudulent, or why Plaintiff must be included
in the title.
Further, the Court dismisses the count for claim preclusion and lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the matter because of the pending Iowa
case. As mentioned above, in Shaddock v. Shaddock, 2025-CAB-000953, Plaintiff Shaddock filed
a petition to add his name to the title for the same property in question. See Order, March 20, 2025.
The Court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that D.C. is not the appropriate forum
to adjudicate the matter considering the existence of the Iowa divorce proceeding. By Plaintiff’ s
own admission, he owns the "marital property" with Defendant since 1985, which therefore
subjects it to the purview of Iowa courts. Am. Compl at 1. Therefore, the Court dismisses the claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and claim preclusion.
Accordingly, it is by the Court, this 10th day of February 2026, hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that all Counts are DIMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the case is DIMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the case is CLOSED.
THIS IS A FINAL ORDER.
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SO ORDERED.
Judge Carl E. Ross
Copies to all Parties.
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